1939 When Hitler
told Dönitz early in the year that he was
planning for a war six years in the future, Dönitz
developed plans for the construction of a U-boat fleet of 300 Type VII
boats. This would allow for 100 on station, 100 in transit, and 100 in training
or under repair. However,
The U-boat war started under 'prize rules', but that policy did not last
long. On the very first day, U-30 sank the liner Athenia
without warning, and 122 of 1,100 passengers perished, including 28 Americans.
Toward the end of September, the High Command authorized “seizure or sinking
without exception” for merchant ships trying to radio for help when ordered
to stop. A week later, U-boats received the order to sink without warning any
ship sailing without lights, with commanders instructed to enter a note in the
log that the sinking was “due to possible confusion with a warship or
auxiliary cruiser”.
By November, the Germans had withdrawn all pretenses with Standing Order No.
154: “Rescue no one and take no one aboard . . . Care only for your own boat
and strive to achieve the next success as soon as possible! We must be hard in
this war”.
In June 1940,
Fleet headquarters in
In June 1940
On August 17th, Hitler formally declared a total blockade of the
One example: On
October 16, one U-boat spotted a convoy of 35 ships and called in the rest of
his pack, six more boats. Another boat joined the next day. After three days,
the U-boats had sunk 17 of those ships, had intercepted two other convoys, and
sent 21 more ships to the bottom, without a single U-boat loss. The tally would
have been higher, but most of the submarines had fired all of their torpedoes
and had to go home to re-load.
On
The major effects
of the attack: to coalesce American public opinion as
never before, and to force the US Navy to abandon an ingrained fascination with
battleships and shift the burden to the new-generation warships: the aircraft
carrier and the submarine.
At that time, the US Navy had 111 submarines in commission, including 60
in the
1942 The
Technological
advances such as improved radar, the radar altimeter, the aircraft searchlight,
and effective air-dropped depth charges began to enter the force. Before long,
aircraft could claim participation in 50 percent of all U-boat sinking.
By the end of 1942,
with the U-boat fleet clearly in trouble, Hitler authorized the design of a
fully combat-capable, Walter-cycle, 1,600-ton U-boat designated Type
XVIII. Two prototypes were ordered, but it soon became clear that not
enough time or money existed to turn this dream into reality. The Germans
converted the design into a conventionally powered submarine, diesel on the
surface, batteries for submerged running, and the rather large space intended
for storage of the Perhydrol was given over to an
extra-large bank of batteries.
The Germans ordered two new classes. The 1,600-ton Type XXI had only
half the range of the comparable Type IX, could manage bursts of 17
knots underwater (compared with seven knots in the Type IX), dive to
almost 1,000 feet (300 feet deeper), and remain totally submerged at economical
creep speed for 11 days. With a sophisticated fire control system, the Type
XXI could launch an attack from a depth of 150 feet.
The 230-ton coastal submarine Type XXIII, meanwhile, had twice the
submerged speed and five times the underwater endurance of the small pre-war Type
II. However, combat effectiveness was severely limited: two torpedoes, no
reloads.
The Germans quickly phased out all other submarine construction in favor of Type
XXI and Type XXIII.
In 1943 The Germans
underestimated the industrial capacity of the
The Germans also underestimated the ability of the Allies to develop and
implement highly effective anti-submarine weapons and tactics. During the year,
the US Navy established anti-submarine 'Hunter-Killer' groups centered
on a small, quickly built so-called 'jeep' carrier, from which perhaps a dozen
airplanes might operate. Long-range aircraft went into service, including the B-24,
which was adapted for anti-submarine efforts. Among other efforts, they put an
end to the 'Milk Cow'. The rendezvous were too easy to spot by air
patrol. Out of nine Type XIV in service in June 1943,
seven had been sunk by August.
By the end of May 1943, the Germans had clearly lost The Battle Of The Atlantic. In that month alone, the Allies sank 41
U-boats, representing 25 percent of
In 1944
1945 How
each country's submarines fared during the war?
Germany
U-boats claimed 14.4 million tons, but Germany lost 821 U-boats Allied aircraft
were responsible for (or directly involved in) the loss of 433 U-boats; surface
ships, 252; accidents, 45; mines, 34; submarines 25 (only one of which happened
when both hunter and victim were submerged); unknown, 15; scuttled by their own
crews, 14; interned in neutral ports, 2; sunk by shore battery, 1.
American submarines sank at least 1,300 Japanese ships, 5.3 million tons,
including one battleship, eight carriers, 11 cruisers, and 180 smaller
warships. The US Navy lost 52 boats; 22 percent of the submarine personnel who
went on patrol did not return. It was the highest casualty rate of any branch
of service, though not as high as that of the German submarine force, which
lost an astonishing 630 men out of every 1,000 who served in the U-boat fleet.
Soviet
The Soviets started the war with the largest submarine fleet: 218. They added
54 and lost 109. They did not have much impact on the course of the war, though
S-13 was credited with the single greatest disaster in maritime history: the
1945 sinking of the German liner Wilhelm Gustloff,
which was engaged in an effort to get German soldiers out of the path of the
advancing Red Army. More than 8,000 troops and civilians may have been aboard;
fewer than 1,000 were rescued.
Japanese submarines had great success early in the war, especially in the
On the last day of
the Pacific war,
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